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(Manuscript received 10 March 1985, in final form 20 September 1985)
ABSTRACT

Severe and widespread drought occurred over a large portion of the 1.!nited States betw.een 1974 and 1977.
Impacts on agriculture and other industries, as well as l~ water'Sup~bes, were substan~. The ~ederal government responded with forty assistance programs admmistered by SIXteen federal agenaes: ~ce ~
provided primarily in the form ofloans and grants to people, businesses and governments expenenClDg hardship
.
caused by drought. The total cost of the program is estimated at $7-8 billion.
. Federal response to the mid-1970s drought was largely untimely, ineffective and poorly coordinated. Four
recommendations are offered that, if implemented, would imp~ove. future drou~t assessl!'-ent and response
efforts: 1) reliable and timely informational products and dissemmatlon p!ansj .2) Im~roved Impact ~ment
techniques, especially in the agriC11ltural sector, for use by government to Iden~ penods of enhanced nsk and
to trigger assistance measures; 3) administratively centralized drought declaratlon procedures ~t are well p~b
licized and consistently applied; and 4) standby assistance measures that encourage appropnate levels o~nsk
management by producers and that are equitable, consistent and predictab~e. 'J?Ie ~evelopmen~ of a natlonal
drought plan tbat incorporates these four items is recommended. Atmospbenc SClentlsts have an Importan~ ~le
to play in the collection and interpretation of near-real time weather data for use by government declSlon
makers.

1. Introduction
Drought is a characteristic feature' of the climate of
the Great Plains. Although scientists disagree on what
constitutes a drought (Wilhite and Glantz, 1985), it
represents a common experience that, in a sense, binds
the region together. During the past century the Great
Plains has been plagued by five major and numerous
minor drought episodes as well as innumerable dry
spells. In fact, drought occurs somewhere in the Great
Plains almost every year.
Although severe drought generally occurs more frequently in the Great Plains than elsewhere in the
United States, no part ofthe nation is immune (Karl
and Knight, 1985). Severe drought is generally aSsociatedwith cumulative moisture deficiencies of sufficient magnitude that, when extended over a substantial
length of time, result in far-reaching impacts over a
rather large geographical area. For example, in response
to the severe drought of July and August of 1983 the
federal government designated 1123 counties in 22
states as drought disaster areas. In addition to the designations that were made in the Great Plains states of
• Published as Paper No. 7720, Journal Series, Nebraska AgriC11ltural Experiment Station.
t NCAR is sponsored by the National Science Foundation.
@

J986 American Meteorological Society

Nebraska, Kansas, New Mexico and Texas, the federal
.
government also declared parts of Alabama, Georgia,
Virginia, West Virginia, Tennessee, Kentucky, .South
Carolina,Pennsylvania and parts of most Mldwest
states eligible for low-interest disaster loans because of
drought.
. .
The actions of the federal government 10 responding
to the 1983 drought are not unique. In fact, these actions seem almost inconsequential when compared to
the massive drought relief programs formulated in response to the major episodes of severe drought that
have occurred in the United States during the 20th
century. For example, during the droughts of the mid19705 the federal government was responsible for the
most massive drought relief program in United States
history. The General Accounting Office (GAO, 1979)
calculated the cost of the drought program to four federal agencies alone at over $5 billion during 1976-77.
Wilhite et al. (1984) estimated expenditures by all federal agencies involved in the response effort, plus administrative costs at both the federal and state level,
between $7-8 billion from 1974-77.
In 1981 we began to document and evaluate federal
and state response to the mid-1970s drought in the
United States. A preliminary report of our findings appears elsewhere (Wilhite, 1983). Since each drought
relief effort has relied, to some extent, on the precedents
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set in previous episodes, it is not surprising that some
mistakes and failures have been repeated. Here we
document and evaluate efforts to respond to drought
in 1976-77. Recommendations are given on ways to
improve the effectiveness of the federal government's
response to future droughts. The advantages of a national drought plan that would incorporate most of
these recommendations will also be discussed.
2. Methodology
The task of documenting and evaluating federal and
state response to drought in the United States was divided into four subtasks in order to address the project
objectives most efficiently. The first subtask was to
document the history of government and nongovernment drought response in the Great Plains from the
period of settlement up to the 1950s. In subtask 2 we
documented, in greater detail, federal and state response to the mid-1970s drought. This involved study
of the overall federal drought response structure, including assistance programs, designation procedures,
information availability and flow, and policy formulation procedures. In subtask 3 the federal drought actions were evaluated with reference to each of the components listed in subtask 2. In subtask 4 we documented and evaluated federal and state government
actions in response to drought in Nebraska, South
Dakota and Texas. In this paper we report the results
of subtasks 2 and 3, particularly. The results of each
of the subtasks are presented in greater detail elsewhere
(Wilhite et aI., 1984).
Information about the actions of federal and state
agencies in assessing and responding to the mid-1970s
drought was derived through an analysis of official
government files, personal interviews with government
and nongovernment officials, and by mail questionnaire. The following were the main sources of information:
I) Gerald R. Ford Presidential Library, Ann Arbor,
Michigan;
2) Secretary of Agriculture Executive Correspondence Files, Washington, DC;
3) Agricultural Stabilization and Conservation Service files, Washington, DC;
4) Corps of Engineers files, Ft. Belvoir, Virginia;
5) Office of Intergovernmental Affairs, U.S. Department of Agriculture, Washington, DC;
6) National Archives, Washington, DC;
7) History Branch, U.S. Department of Agriculture,
Washington, DC;
8) National Agricultural Library, Beltsville, Maryland;
9) Dwight D. Eisenhower Presidential Library,
Abilene, Kansas;
1O} Western Governors' Policy Office (WESTPO),
Denver, Colorado;
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11) State and federal agency files in Nebraska, South
Dakota, and Texas.
By analyzing both primary sources of information and
numerous secondary sources, we were able to reconstruct the timetable of events associated with the mid1970s drought and evaluate the series of assessment
and response actions implemented by federal and state
government.
3. Federal response to drought in 1976-77
That the federal government would attempt to mitigate some of the most severe impacts of widespread
drought during the mid-1970s was not unexpected.
Droughts of greater intensity and duration during the
1930s and 1950s had produced similar responses. Although the organizational structure for administering
drought relief and the forms of assistance available
changed significantly during the fifty years before the
mid-1970s drought, the fundamental approach did not.
During the mid-I 970s drought, the Federal Disaster
Assistance Administration (FDAA) was responsible for
administering grants to presidentially declared disaster
areas from the President's Disaster Relief Fund. Moreover, the FDAA was responsible for directing and coordinating the assistance efforts of all federal agencies
(FDAA, 1975). The list of federal disaster assistance
programs available in 1975 was extensive. Few, if any,
of these programs had been designed specifically to respond to problems caused by drought.
The series of state and federal actions that resulted
in response to the drought of 1976-77 are described
in detail below. Table 1 provides a timetable for these
actions.
Federal Drought Response, 1976. The first federal
actions were initiated during the last year of the Ford
administration in response to requests from Governor
Richard F. Kneip and Representative James Abdnor
of South Dakota in July of 1976. The governor requested federal agencies to provide maximum assistance to the severely stricken drought areas in his state
(Kneip, 1976). This request prompted the president to
direct the Domestic Council to review the socioeconomic impacts of drought in the Dakotas, Minnesota
and Wisconsin and to determine if additional assistance
could be provided under existing federal laws and programs (May, 1976). The governor's letter was followed
by a request from Representative Abdnor to the secretary of agriculture for the creation of a special task
force to review and improve current drought assistance
programs (Abdnor, 1976). In response to Abdnor's request, a special cabinet-level drought committee was
formed by the president in late October. The committee's objectives included the development of a drought
monitoring scheme and a comprehensive plan and
program for delivering short-term assistance to
drought-affected areas.
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TABLE 1. Drought-related actions and responses of the federal and state government, 1976-77.
Action/Date

Response/Date

1976
Request for action from South Dakota governor and othersJuly

Domestic Council directed by President Ford to review
socioeconomic impact-September

Request by Rep. Abdnor (South Dakota) for the creation of a
drought task force-July

President Ford appoints special cabinet-level task forceOctober, issues report in December

1977
States form regional alliances, Western Governor's Task Force
on Regional Policy Management meets to discuss drought
conditions-January

Western States Water Council begins to monitor droughtJanuary

Western governors meet with Secretary Andrus-January

Commitments by federal and state governments for action,
President Carter and governors appoint drought
coordinators-January to early March

Federal drought coordinator requests drought-related
information from 13 federal agencies-February

Drought appraisal report prepared under leadership of the
Corps of Engineers for submission to President Cartermid-March
.

Presidential drought package for $844 million submitted to
Congress-March 23

Drought package passed almost intact by Congress, except for
two items-April to early May

Formation of an Interagency Drought Coordinating
Committee to designate Emergency Drought Impact Areas
under the president's drought program-April

2145 counties declared by this committee between April 25
and September 12

Drought conditions improve between April and August in the
Great Plains and Upper Midwest states, and by December in
the Far West states

Federal drought assistance estimated between $7-8 billion for
1976-77

The special cabinet-level drought committee reported to President Ford on 28 December 1976. By
this time, 325 counties had been declared emergency
disaster areas. Basically, the report provided a summary
of federal response to date, a status report of the current
situation and an indication of problem areas. Their
findings suggested that current programs "may not be
able to cope effectively if the situation deteriorates
much further" (Bell, 1976). The report concluded,
". . . When drought occurs it is difficult to determine
the nature and extent of federal assistance required,
and some emergency programs are not designed to cope
with agricultural drought."
The drought committee's report reached President
Ford on 3 January 1977, seventeen days before the end
of his term of office. The committee's report provided
only a cursory examination of the drought problem
and did not deal with the questions oflong-term policy
cited among the committee's original objectives. Included in the report was a tabulation showing federal
assistance in presidentially declared emergency areas
up to 1 December 1976 (Table 2).
Federal drought response during the Ford administration is best summarized as reaction-oriented. Little,
ifany, planning was done to develop alternative actions
under possible scenarios of future conditions. No new
programs were developed and no coordinated effort
was made to respond to deteriorating conditions.

Federal Drought Response, 1977. In January of
1977, regional alliances were formed by states to put
added political pressure on Washington for action. On
23 January 1977, the Western Governors' Task Force
on Regional Policy Management met to discuss the
scope and magnitude of western drought (WESTPO,
1978). Following this meeting, the western governors'
lead agency for water policy and development, the
Western States Water Council (Wswq, began to
monitor the drought situation at regular intervals. The
governors met with the newly appointed interior secretary, Cecil Andrus, to discuss state needs and federal
actions to mitigate the societal impact of drought. Although many areas of the nation were entering their
second, arid a few locations their third, consecutive
year of drought, .this was the first such joint discussion
of mitigation alternatives by state and federal officials.
The meeting with Secretary Andrus concluded with
several commitments by the secretary and the governors. The secretary agreed to seek the appointment of
a federal drought coordinator and to encourage the
president to discuss the drought issue at the National
Governors Conference. The governors also agreed to
consider the need for alternative approaches to cooperative, multilateral drought response actions and to
designate state drought coordinators. [By early March,
twenty states had appointed drought coordinators
(WESTPO, 1978)].
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TABLE 2. Summary offederal grant and loan programs providing assistance due to drought, 1 December 1976 (Bell, 1976). This summary
reflects the applications for grants and loans received and the funds requested therein following the presidential emergency declarations and
through November 1976 in the States of Minnesota, Missouri, North Dakota, South Dakota, Virginia and Wisconsin. Eleven counties in
Arkansas were declared eligible for assistance on 3 December 1976. The data contained herein is limited to assistance provided in the areas
covered by the presidential emergency declarations due to drought. The assistance included in this report is being provided through emergency
and regular program authorities.

AgencyjProgram

Applications
received

Estimated
amount
($)

Applications
payments

Amount paid
($)

Federal Disaster Assistance Administration, DHUD
Hay and Cattle Transportation Assistance ............. .

18,456

83,312,926

9,701

Small Business Administration
Economic Injury Disaster Loans .................... .

31

1,101,500

19

701,500

151,869

172,050,000

70,712

65,497,000

NjA

4,300,000

Agricultural Stabilization and Conservation Service, USDA
Disaster Payment Program ......................... .
Emergency Livestock Feed Program (Now being phased out
due to lack of CCC-owned feed grain stocks) ........ .

NjA

4,300,00

Farmers Home Administration, USDA
Emergency Loans ................................ .

7,300

207,263,000

2,956

Economic Development Administration, DOC
Economic Development-Special Economic Development
and Adjustment Assistance Program ............... .

22

Undetermined··

8

7,154,121*

133,263,000

1,556,000*

* Partial payments on some applications.
•• Amount to be determined after further evaluation.

In response to these initiatives President Carter appointed Jack Watson to be federal drought coordinator.
One of Watson's first actions was to request each of
thirteen federal agencies to prepare a report by 3 March
(a lead time ofless than one week) that would include:
1) a brief evaluation of the impacts and drought-related
problems in each agency's area of responsibility; 2) a
list and description of drought assistance programs; 3)
a statement of administration or funding problems; 4)
an evaluation of complaints from state and local governments and drought victims; 5) suggestions of legislative changes or initiatives that might help to better
organize and deliver federal assistance in support of
state and local government efforts (Watson, 1977).
The agency reports submitted to Watson totaled
several thousand pages and were, not surprisingly,
lacking in uniformity and consistency. Watson recognized the inability of his staff to restructure the raw
information provided by the agencies into a format
that would be useful in the decision-making process
(Kallaur, 1977). The Corps of Engineers was asked to
coordinate this assimilation process. The Corps accepted this task and completed it within one week, as
directed. The thirteen reporting agencies became
known as the White House Drought Study Group. The
Drought Appraisal Report, as it was called, was completed on March 18 and served as the basis for President
Carter's drought program.
The Drought Appraisal Report described drought
conditions in the United States and addressed questions

of water conservation, water supply augmentation and
management measures, and suggested possible immediate mitigating actions. The report concentrated
heavily on drought impacts in the Far West, sometimes
to the point of down playing, if not neglecting, those
areas plagued by extreme drought in the Midwest and
northern plains states.
Federal response activities continued to expand
during March as drought conditions intensified and
encompassed larger geographic areas. Emergency loans
from FmHA were made available to 706 counties in
27 states. Livestock feed assistance was provided in
436 counties in 12 states by ASCS. By the end of March
the FDAA was providing aid to 16 states, by presidential declaration, through three assistance programs
(FDAA, 1977). The three programs provided assistance
for hay transportation, cattle transportation and emergency feed. The USDA was responsible for coordinating most of the assistance activities in the agricultural
sector.
President Carter sent a request to Congress on 23
March for $844 million in loans and grants for farmers,
ranchers, communities and businesses stricken by
drought. Table 3 provides the details of the president's
program. This program was passed intact by Congress,
except for the Small Business Administration legislation and a reduction in funds, from $225 to $175 million, for the Economic Development Agency (EDA)
loan and grant program (Crawford, 1978). The water
bank bill was signed by the president on 7 April. Other
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TABLE 3. President Carter's proposed drought program, 23 March 1977 (WESTPO, 1978).
Amount ($)

Purpose/Description

Title
Emergency Loans Program (FmHA)

5% loans to cover prospective losses to farmers and ranchers

100,000,000

Community Program Loans (FmHA)

$150 million in 5% loans and $75 million in grants to communities ofless
than 10,000 for emergency water supplies

225,000,000

Emergency Conservation Measures
Program (ASCS)

Soil Conservation cost-sharing grants

100,000,000

FCIC Insurance

Increase FCIC capital stock

100,000,000

Drought Emergency Program
(BuRec)

Creation of water bank, protection of fish and wildlife, grants to states, 5%
for water supply and conservation measures

100,000,000

Emergency Fund (BuRec)

Emergency irrigation loans

30,000,000

Emergency Power (SWPA)

Purchase of emergency· power supply

13,800,000

Community Emergency Drought
Relief Program (EDA)

$150 million in 5% loans and $75 million in grants to communiti~s of
more than 10,000 for emergency water supply

·Physical Loss and Economic Injury
Loans (SBA)

Low-interest loans for small businessmen (including farmers)

225,000,000*
50,000,000**

Total

844,000,000

* Only $175 million of this amount was finally appropriated.
** Action on this proposal resulted in the lowering of interest rates for Physical Loss and Economic Injury Loans (both ongoing, funded
programs) but none of the additional appropriation originally requested was granted.

portions of the "package" were delayed until early May.
Program funds were to be expended or committed by
30 September 1977.
In late March, discussion was initiated on the formation of an Interagency Drought Coordinating Committee (IDCC), the major function of which was to
designate areas eligible for federal assistance. This federal assistance, however, referred only to programs authorized in President Carter's "drought package."
Members ofthe IDCC included representatives ofthe
United States Department of Agriculture (chairman),
the Small Business Administration and the Departments of Interior and Commerce. Geographic areas
designated by the IDCC were referred to as Emergency
Drought Impact Areas (EDIAs).
During the first formal meeting of the IDCC, held
on 25 April 1977, the committee designated 1183
counties as EDIAs. Of these, 842 had already received
presidential or secretarial declarati9ns (Stockton, 1977).
The EDIAs were located in 24 western and midwestern
states. The list of declarations grew during the summer
months. By 12 September 1977, the date of the last
declaration, 2145 counties (70 percent of all counties
in the United States) were included as EDIAs (Fig. 1).
These designations were to expire on 30 September.
In the early stages of the IDCC there were no distinct
criteria for the designation of EDIAs. At least half of
the counties designated during this time period were
so designated with no supporting documentation. The
need for such criteria was discussed during the third
meeting of the IDCC, on 3 May. It was agreed that
ASCS would draft a ~ist of criteria. The list was pre-

sented to and approved by the committee on 20 May.
The list included the Palmer Drought Severity Index
(PDSI). This index was apparently the principal criteria
used by the IDCC to determine eligibility for drought
assistance (GAO, 1979).
Considerable confusion appears to have developed
over IDCC designations. Many federal and state officials assumed that counties were automatically eligible
for all federal programs after they had been designated
by the IDCe. Although it is not so specified in the
2200
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FIG. I. Emergency Drought Impact Areas (EDIAs) designated by
the IDCC between April 25 and September 12, 1977 (Federal Register).
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original memorandum of agreement, IDCC designations were intended to apply only to programs included
in the presidential drought package. Following IDCC
designation, counties became automatically eligible for
only one of the many drought package programs,
FmHA's Emergency Loan Program. To qualify for
other programs in the package, counties had to meet
the special eligibility requirements of each program.
Eligibility for programs not included in the presidential
drought package was determined on a program-byprogram basis and was not linked to IDCC designations.
The only distinction between IDCC designated and
non-IDCC counties was that the former had access to
the special drought funds associated with the president's
drought package. IDCC designations were sweeping,
usually focusing on states rather than individual counties. The detailed, county-level evaluation process was
left to the several involved federal agencies.
Although the presidential drought package was substantial ($844 million)-one of the largest single appropriations for drought relief in the nation's historyit represented only a small portion of the total federal
drought assistance program. Forty programs were
available to provide assistance to the private sector
during 1976-77. However, six programs accounted for
the vast majority of funds disbursed. These were: 1)
the Farmers' Home Administration's Emergency Loan
Program; 2) the Small Business Administration's Disaster Loan Program; 3) the Department of Commerce's Community Emergency Drought Relief Program; 4) the Bureau of Reclamation's Emergency Fund
Program; 5) the Bureau of Reclamation's Emergency
Drought Program; and 6) the Farmers' Home Administration's Community Program Loans and Grants.
The authorizations and activities associated with each
of these programs during the 1976-77 drought have
been summarized in a General Accounting Office report (GAO, 1979) entitled "Federal Response to the
1976-77 Drought: What Should Be Done Next?" The
GAO reported that the Departments of Agriculture,
Commerce, and Interior and SBA alone administered
more than $5 billion in drought relief programs to water
users during 1976-77. However, if the cost of programs
administered by other federal agencies is included, as
well as the cost of the relief programs of 1974 and
drought-related administration costs to states during
1974-77, the total cost of the drought to government
can be conservatively estimated at between $7-8 billion
(Wilhite et aI., 1984).
4. Improving federal response to drought: Recommendations
In view of the experiences of the mid-1970s and previous drought relief efforts, certain lessons emerge
about ways to improve governmental response to pe-
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riods of widespread and severe drought. Based on the
foregoing information, four basic requirements for
more effective response by federal government are suggested: 1) reliable and timely information and dissemination plans; 2) objective and reliable impact assessment procedures; 3) objective and timely designation
procedures; and 4) appropriate disaster programs and
efficient program administration and delivery systems.
Information products and dissemination plans. The
drought response efforts of the mid-1970s were not
based on adequate and systematic provision of timely
information on drought conditions and impacts to individuals and agencies involved in administering programs. Although the availability of reliable, current and
properly formatted information does not ensure correct
and timely decisions on the part of government officials, it is at least reasonable to believe that good decisions are less likely to be made on the basis of inadequate or incorrect information.
Many types of information are needed during periods of drought if the widely ranging impacts associated with water shortages are to be adequately addressed. For example, meteorological data is necessary
to describe the degree of water shortage and to identify
those geographical areas most affected. Such data, in
conjunction with information on soil moisture conditions, can be used for early projections of yield.
Commodity prices, in conjunction with projected yield
figures, can be used to estimate monetary losses for
principal grain, vegetable and hay crops. Data on
stream flow ap.d ground water depletion rates provide
important information on the outlook for water supply
to the agricultural, municipal and industrial sectors.
A common requirement for all types of droughtrelated information is that it be reliable, effectively organized and timely. In almost all cases during the mid1970s drought, government agencies did not assemble
assessments of the drought situation until drought
conditions had reached critical proportions.
To improve the ability of government to respond
effectively in times of drought, the drought situation
and its consequent impacts must be continually monitored. Since weather data form the basis for virtually
all other assessments, special attention should be given
to providing relevant observations of precipitation and
calculations of evapotranspiration and soil moisture
status. Networks of automated weather stations such
as the one being developed in Nebraska, South Dakota,
Colorado, Kansas and Wyoming under partial support
of the National Climate Program Office, can provide
the data needed for the aforementioned calculations.
This network currently provides near real-time data
for seven meteorological parameters-solar radiation,
wind direction and speed, precipitation, humidity,
temperature and soil temperature (Hubbard et al.,
1983).
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tems should be considered in the impact assessment
issue. For example, a PDSI of - 3.0 in July may signal
substantial reduction in yield of rionirrigated com because of destruction of reproductive tissue. Were moisture conditions to improve, com yield would still be
low but soybeans, whose reproductive activity continues through much ofthe growing season, may produce
Impact assessment procedures. A long-standing near normal yields.
problem in responding to drought has been the lack of
Clearly, new techniques must be developed to enreliable procedures for assessing probable impact. Be- hance our drought impact assessment capability. Imcause drought normally has its most immediate and pacts are most precisely estimated on a crop-specific
substantial impact on the agricultural sector, improved basis. Agricultural meteorologists and agronomists,
techniques for assessing, in near-real time, the impact working together, have the skills needed to develop
of weather conditions on crops and rangeland should crop-specific drought indices. Automated weather data
greatly improve our ability to identify and, therefore, networks are now providing the data to support the
to speed assistance to areas affected by drought.
development and operation of these indices in some
Historically, the most common criterion used by drought-prone regions. These data can also support
government to identify areas stricken by drought has numerous other assessment-related activities of state
been percent of normal precipitation. This information, government. Therefore, states should play an important
as well as local reports of crop, pasture and livestock role in supporting the development and maintenance
conditions and human distress, were used extensively ofthese networks.
during the 1930s and 1950s.
During 1976-77 the PDSI was used by federal agenDrought designation procedures. The development
cies and the IDCC to establish eligibility of areas for of objective and timely procedures to determine elidrought relief (GAO, 1979). A map showing the dis- gibility for federal disaster assistance is a necessary
tribution of PDSI values was (and is) published regu- condition for the improvement of government response
larly in the Weekly Weather and Crop Bulletin. The to drought. Although standby legislation and response
PDSI is intended to describe long-term moisture con- plans may reduce delays in program formulation and
ditions. More recently, the Crop Moisture Index (CMI), implementation, the lack of appropriate designation
a modification of the PDSI and more agriculturally procedures and reliable, objective criteria on which to
appropriate, has been used by federal agencies to assess base those designations hampers the delivery of proshort-term moisture conditions (Palmer, 1968; Na- grams to the affected area and leads to ineffective retional Weather Service, 1977). The CMI was not widely sponse.
used during 1976-77.
Procedures for designating counties eligible for asThe PDSI has been increasingly criticized in recent sistance have changed with each drought episode. Duryears by scientists (Changnon, 1980; Wilhite, 1983; ing a particular episode, procedures have been altered
Alley, 1984). Inconsistencies have been noted between in response to deteriorating weather conditions.
the PDSI and actual severity of the drought impacts Changes in political administration in the middle of a
observed. There are several reasons for the lack of drought can also be expected to result in changing desagreement between calculated PDSI values and actual ignation procedures. During the mid-1970s drought
drought severity, particularly with respect to agricul- the procedure for designating counties eligible for ditural drought. Specific crop responses to drought were saster assistance was more complicated and confusing
not considered in the derivation of the index, nor do than it had been in previous droughts, partly because
they figure in the calculation of index values. Yet, the more agencies and committees were involved in adPDSI is used, qualitatively, to assess drought impacts ministering the programs (Wilhite et al., 1984),
The GAO (1978) has summarized the substantial
on crops. Additionally, the Thornthwaite method
(Thornthwaite, 1948) of estimating evapotranspiration differences in the disaster declaration procedures used
(ET) is used in the calculation of PDSI values. The by major agencies-FmHA and SBA during 1977. The
Thornthwaite method is unable to account for sensible effect of these differences in disaster declaration proheat advection, a major source of the energy that drives cedures was such that, during the period July 1977
the ET process in the Great Plains region. Thus, there through January 1978, FmHA and SBA operated their
is concern that the Thornthwaite method severely programs in 45 and 14 states, respectively. Within states
underestimates ET in subhumid and semiarid regions where both agencies operated, certain counties were
(Rosenberg, et al., 1983) and, accordingly, that the covered by only one of the two agency programs.
Our examination and evaluation of the function,
PDSI tends to overestimate the amount of water reprocedures and actions ofthe IDCC has identified sevmaining in the soil (Smith, 1983).
Regional differences in land use and cropping sys- eral specific problem areas (Wilhite et al., 1984). First,
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the existence and precise function of the IDCC was
poorly understood by government officials, especially
at the state level. In many cases, designations by the
committee were interpreted by government officials as
an automatic qualification of their state or county for
all federal disaster assistance programs. FmHA's
Emergency Loan Program was the only government
program actually enabled by IDCC action.
Second, IDCC designations were broad and sweeping, and impacts identified by states were not verified
by the committee on the basis of a common set of
objective data. No IDCC evaluation criteria were actually available until early June, and then they were
not widely understood. Of the 2145 counties designated
by the IDCC between 25 April and 12 September 1977,
approximately 1575, or 73 percent, were approved before the criteria had been properly defined. Although
entire states were often designated by the IDCC, actual
impact areas were of limited geographical extent. For
example, the primary impact area in Nebraska in 1977,
in terms of production losses of the principal grain
crops, was confined to a nine-county area in the extreme southeastern comer of the state. The IDCC designated the entire state (93 counties) on April 25. These
sweeping designations provided many counties
throughout the nation not affected by the severe
drought with access to FmHA emergency loans. This
action also led to the illusion of a severe nationwide
drought. Such an illusion can, in the long run, be detrimental to the establishment of future drought relief
programs. The following editorial on the 1977 Federal
drought response effort (Washington Post, September
27, 1977) is given as an example:
THE DISASTER THAT WASN'T

The com crop this year is the largest in the country's
history. The wheat and soybean crops are huge and
come close to setting records of their own. California's
vegetable production is up. It's been a big year on the
farm.
Now consider this curiosity: Two-thirds of the
country is currently designated a drought disaster area
by the federal government. There are 3,044 counties
in the United States, and some 2,100 of them are
Emergency Drought Impact Areas. They include everything west of the Mississippi except parts of Texas
and Washington. They also include much ofthe Midwest and a swath of the South from Virginia's Shenandoah Valley down to the Gulf Coast. A farmer in a
drought area is eligible for special loans at interest rates
as low as 3 percent.
The weather this year has been, once again, eccentric.
It was the dry winter that induced President Carter
and Congress to collaborate on drought-aid legislation
last spring. Then rain came-not enough to end all of
the shortages in communities around the country, but
enough to produce a tremendous harvest.
Drought aid has now degenerated into a kind of
general relief for farmers, extended in the form of cheap
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credit. Most of the beneficiaries are currently threatened not by drought and shriveled crops, but by precisely the opposite condition: crops so magnificently
bountiful that prices have dropped dramatically. Some
ofthese farmers, you could argue, genuinely need help.
But it's a bad practice to bend an aid program covertly
from one purpose to another. That generally results in
a lot of aid going to people who don't need it.
The emergency-<irought program ends on Sept. 30,
and the question at the Agriculture Department is
whether to do it again next year. The danger of drought
is certainly real. It is necessary to think carefully about
the possibility that the climate-and in particular the
rain pattern-may be shifting. While this summer's
rain was enough for the com and wheat, it wasn't
enough to fill reservoirs and restore water tables. If
next winter is as dry as last winter, a much larger number of communities will feel the water shortage. A dry
summer next year would certainly justify federal aid
to farmers.
But the drought aid needs to be tied to the actual
effect of weather on individual farmer's final harvests.
The Carter administration has been doing it the other
way, providing aid on the basis of regional rainfall at
the beginning of the season. As this year's experience
shows, that can mean an expensive program of disaster
aid when, as it turns out, there was no disaster.
Third, the criteria established by the IDCC were not
fully reliable for the purpose of identifying affected
areas, although they were probably the best available
at the time. Assessments by federal agencies were improvised from the data at hand. However, these needed
data were not available to the committee that was
charged with evaluating all requests for assistance. Also,
the data available to the committee was, in some cases,
out of date. Therefore, decisions were, at times, based
on information that may not have represented the situation accurately.

Disaster programs, program administration and delivery systems. As many as forty separate programs were
available to provide assistance to drought victims in
the form ofloans, grants and insurance during the mid1970s (Table 3). These programs can be clustered into
two broad categories. The first included short-term actions to avoid or lessen the impact of drought by augmenting water supplies. This was the primary objective
of President Carter's drought program. The second
group involved programs designed to make loans to
farmers to compensate them for production losses and
to provide them with working capital. The wide range
of assistance programs available reflects the variety of
groups and economic sectors affected by drought and
the lack of a coordinated federal disaster response plan.
Two characteristics of these disaster programs can
be noted. First, only a few of the programs available
in the mid-I 970s were designed to address the specific
problems associated with drought. Rather, they were
originally formulated by Congress to respond to prob-
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lems of soil and water conservation and to other natural
disasters such as flooding. Second, other than the ongoing programs implemented in response to previous
20th century drought episodes (e.g., Great Plains Conservation Program), the programs of the mid-1970s
were intended to be short-term or tactical. No new
long-term program initiatives were instituted during
this period.
The GAO (1979) indicated four major problem areas
in its study of the programs and the administration of
programs that were part of the 1976-77 federal drought
response effort. First, several drought programs were
enacted too late to lessen the effects of drought. For
example, President Carter's drought program did not
receive congressional approval until April and, in some
cases, May. In the Far West it had been apparent since
January 1977 that a water shortage would occur during
the irrigation season. As another example, delays in
congressional approval also sharply reduced the effectiveness of certain programs. For example, $75 million
was authorized to the Bureau of Reclamation for the
Water Bank Program. However, only $4.8 million was
spent in this manner because most growers of lower
value annual crops had already planted by the time
the program was implemented. It was too late to reallocate water to the higher value perennial crops.
Second, many projects that were approved violated
. congressional intent to augment water supplies on a
short-term basis. Several projects were initiated so late
that water could not be supplied during the drought
for which the aid had been given. Construction of other
projects did not even begin until after the drought had
ended. Also, drought loans and grants appear to have
been used to provide a low-cost source of federal financing for nondrought-related projects.
Third, eligibility and repayment criteria for emergency drought programs were inconsistent, inequitable
and confusing. Although substantial differences in criteria existed between many disaster programs, the differences between the FmHA's Emergency Loan Program and SBA's Disaster Loan Program are, perhaps,
the most interesting because they were directed to the
same target groups. (For specific differences between
these two programs, see the 1978 GAO report.) Loans
obligated through these two programs totaled $4.63
billion during 1976-77.
Fourth, inadequate coordination among agencies led
to program overlap and nonuniform standards for determining eligible drought relief projects. The GAO
cites several specific examples of loan applicants applying to two agencies. In some cases, applications were
approved by both agencies, and applicants could choose
the loan with the most favorable terms.
The GAO (1979) concluded its examination of the
1976-77 federal drought response effort with the recommendation that Congress direct the four primary
agencies administering assistance programs (USDA,
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SBA, Departments of Interior and Commerce) to assess
the problems encountered in providing emergency relief. Based on the findings of this assessment, GAO
recommended that a national drought plan be developed to provide assistance in a more timely, consistent
and equitable manner. According to GAO, this plan
should identify the respective roles of agencies to avoid
the overlap and duplication that has been associated
with previous drought response efforts. They recommended that the Congress consider legislation that
would more clearly define those roles, and also recommended standby legislation (i.e., authorizing assistance programs) to permit more timely response to
drought-related problems.
In the light of-our research, the recommendations
of GAO appear eminently sensible. The number of
agencies participating in drought assistance activities
during 1976-77, as well as the number of programs
available, indicates the obvious need for an assessment
and response plan organized under the leadership of a
single agency. In the process of developing such a plan,
all disaster assistance programs should be reviewed in
terms of their consistency, efficiency and equity, as well
as their relevance in dealing with the problems and
impacts associated with drought. Most assistance programs were developed, originally, to address problems
resulting from the occurrence of other natural hazards
other than drought or in response to specific water supply problems. During droughts these programs have
simply been redirected. Also, more attention needs to
be given to alleviating drought impact and facilitating
recovery in the agricultural sector.
We recommend that multidisciplinary studies be
initiated to define the impacts of past droughts. We
further recommend that scenarios be used to help evaluate probable impacts of future drought. The results
of such studies could aid in identifying real needs for
drought assistance programs, reduce the number of
such programs and lead to improved efficiency in their
administration.
5. Conclusions
Governments in the United States often respond to
drought through crisis management. This was the case
in the mid-1970s 'as well as in previous episodes of
widespread and severe drough( In crisis management
the time to act is perceived by decision makers to be
short. Reaction to crisis often results in the implementation of hastily prepared assessment and response
procedures that lead to ineffective, poorly coordinated
and untimely response. If planning were initiated between periods of drought, the opportunity would exist
to develop an organized response that might more effectively address issues and specific problem areas. Also,
the limited resources available to government to mitigate the effects of drought might be allocated in a more
beneficial manner.
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In 1979 the General Accounting Office recommended the formulation of a national drought plan to
provide assistance in a more timely, consistent and equitable way to drought-affected areas (GAO, 1979). The
GAO proposed that this plan identify 1) the respective
roles of agencies involved in drought response to avoid
overlap and duplication; 2) the need for legislation to
more closely define these roles; and 3) the need for
standby legislation to permit more timely response to
drought-related problems.
Our report has identified four requirements for effective response to drought by government. First, reliable and timely information on drought conditions
and drought-related impacts must be developed and
properly assembled and disseminated. This requires
near-real time meteorological data on which informational products can be based. Second, impact assessment techniques must be improved. In the case of
agriculture, usually the first economic sector to experience the hardships of drought, new types of analyses
must be developed to provide decision makers at all
levels with the types of information necessary to understand the severity of drought and its impacts so that
appropriate actions can be implemented in a timely
manner. Third, designation procedures must be centralized under a single agency or committee with complete authority to determine eligibility for all assistance
programs. Criteria must be determined in advance of
drought, well publicized when drought occurs and applied in a consistent manner. Finally, assistance programs must be developed in advance of drought to
avoid the delays in program formulation and congressional approval that occurred in the mid-1970s. These
programs should be administered by a single agency
through the mechanism of an interagency committee
composed of representatives from all federal agencies
with responsibility in drought assessment and response.
State and/or regional representatives should be included in the membership of this committee. Assistance
programs must address the specific problems associated
with drought.
The GAO's recommendation for a national drought
plan has considerable merit. For such a plan to be effective, however, states must take a more active role
in planning for drought. In the past, most states have
played a passive role, relying almost exclusively on the
federal government to rescue residents of the drought
area. Although federal government has, for lack of an
alternative, accepted this role, improving government
response to drought requires a cooperative effort. States
must develop their own organizational plans for collecting, analyzing and disseminating information on
drought conditions. This information should form the
basis for more objective and timely assessments of impact. Each plan should be unique, reflecting the water
supply characteristics and problems of the state and
potential impact areas. State plans should be linked to
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a national drought plan through the interagency committee(s) with responsibility for drought designation
and program administration. Because of the limited
resources available to states, they can be expected to
provide only a minimal level of financial assistance to
drought disaster victims.
One unique aspect of the mid-1970s drought was
the effectiveness of regional organizations of states in
focusing the attention of the federal government on
the problem. The Western Region Drought Action
Task Force, the Western Governors' Policy Office and
the Western States Water Council, working in concert,
were able to make a more unified representation to
federal officials. This lesson should not be forgotten.
Regional organizations should consider centralizing
their monitoring and assessment activities as one means
of improving the efficiency and accuracy of information
flow to the federal government and, by so doing, increasing their influence on drought policy.
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